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locational effects depends on the assumed market structure. Manders and Veenendaal (2008) use a different model and find only modest competitiveness effects from a policy to reduce emissions in the European Union in 2020 to 20 percent below 1990 levels when accompanied by a BTA. In contrast, Babiker and Rutherford (2005) model the Kyoto Protocol in a CGE framework and find more substantial competitiveness effects. Recent work focuses on border tax adjustments as remedies to the competitiveness and carbon leakage problem. Mattoo et al. (2009) highlight how carbon-related BTAs could harm developing economies. The most recent paper, by Elliott et al. (2010) , investigates trade in carbon and finds substantial carbon leakage ranging from 15 percent at low tax rates to over 25 percent for the highest tax rate. Ex-post analyses of trade effects of environmental policy mostly embed a measure of environmental stringency in the gravity framework (Jaffe et al., 1995; Ederington et al., 2005; Levinson and Taylor, 2008, see, e.g.) . Studies on climate policy are, however, scant. A study by the World Bank (2008) finds no significant competitiveness effects of carbon taxes on energy-intensive trade flows. Aichele and Felbermayr (2011) derive a gravity equation for the carbon content of trade. Their study suggests that Kyoto commitment on average leads to increased carbon imports in committed countries, thereby leading to leakage. Based on aggregate data and on a different way to deal with self-selection of countries into the Protocol, Aichele and Felbermayr (forthcoming) confirm these findings.
We contribute to the literature in the following ways. First, we use a different empirical methodology that combines differences-in-differences estimation with matching techniques to account for the endogeneity of Kyoto commitment. Second, beyond assessing the average effect of Kyoto commitment, we provide an estimate of the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT). From a policy perspective, this is the relevant estimate since it informs about how Kyoto countries' exports -and not an average country's exports -have reacted to their Kyoto commitments so far. And finally, conducting a sectoral analysis of Kyoto's effect on exports allows identifying which sectors' trade flows are affected by the Kyoto Protocol and which are not.
Our empirical approach is motivated by theoretical and empirical work on the economic fundamentals driving international environmental agreement (IEA) and particu-larly Kyoto membership. Since ratification of the Kyoto Protocol is a political process, it is certainly not random. The empirical literature typically distinguishes economic, political and environmental determinants of IEAs (see Murdoch and Sandler, 1997; Beron et al., 2003; Egger et al., 2011, for examples) . GDP or GDP per capita are important variables. York (2005) stresses demographic change as predictor of Kyoto ratification.
And also free-riding on other's efforts might matter (Murdoch and Sandler, 1997; Carraro and Siniscalco, 1998) . Egger et al. (2011) show that a country's trade openness affects its probability to sign IEAs. Finally, the Kyoto status of important trade partners might matter, as in the U.S.-China case. This is the basis for our empirical model to estimate the likelihood of self-selection into Kyoto. The same fundamentals that determine selection into the Kyoto Protocol also drive trade patterns (see Bergstrand, 1989; Eaton and Kortum, 2002; Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003 , for seminal contributions in the gravity literature). In this case, matching techniques are well suited to get an unbiased estimate of the ATT. Although matching is typically used to study effects of, for example, job training programs on labor market outcomes, several studies apply matching in the gravity context (see Persson, 2001; Chintrakarn, 2008; Egger et al., 2008; Baier and Bergstrand, 2009b, for examples) . 2 Fewer studies use matching techniques to estimate the effect of environmental policies. List et al. (2003) employ a differences-in-differences matching estimator to analyze the effects of environmental air quality regulation on plant birth within New York state counties. Millimet and List (2004) extend the study by analyzing heterogeneity in the ATTs for county characteristics.
For a sample of 117 exporters, of which 34 have Kyoto commitments, our estimates suggest that bilateral exports to non-Kyoto countries are reduced by 15-20% due to Kyoto commitment. The average treatment effect for a Kyoto country was 13-14% only.
So our results highlight that not accounting for self-selection overstates the negative effect of Kyoto commitment. We report heterogeneity of Kyoto's treatment effects across 2 Matching is a promising strategy in the gravity context, because it allows matching on relative measures. The sheer number of country pair observations makes it likely to find an appropriate clone (in terms of joint GDP and distance etc.) for a country pair. This is certainly easier and more credible than performing matching for countries. Arguably, it is impossible to find a clone, say, for the U.S. sectors. Some sectors, e.g. iron and steel, organic and inorganic chemicals, plastics and also machinery and equipment exhibit substantial negative competitiveness effects; while Kyoto countries even expanded exports in some sectors, e.g. travel goods and handbags or footwear. For about half of the products (27 out of 51 SITC product classes) we cannot identify significant effects, however. Consistent with theory, energy-intensive industries and sectors producing homogeneous goods are more strongly affected by negative competitiveness effects.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses our empirical strategy and data. Section 3 presents our results and robustness checks. Section 4 contains an analysis of competitiveness effects on the sectoral level. Section 5 concludes.
Empirical strategy and data
We are interested in how Kyoto commitment -i.e. the commitment to an emission cap under the Kyoto Protocol -affects the exports of Kyoto countries. The unit of analysis is a country pair, i.e. an exporter-importer dyad (possibly at the industry level), indexed by i = 1, . . . , N . Let D it ∈ {0, 1} be a treatment dummy that takes on the value of one if country pair i's exporter has a Kyoto commitment in period t and zero else.
Working with a Kyoto dummy is certainly a crude assumption because the intensity of Kyoto commitment might differ across countries. Nevertheless, this approach is common in the treatment evaluation literature, see e.g. the literature on treatment effects of free trade agreements (FTAs) (Baier and Bergstrand, 2007), currency unions (Baldwin and Taglioni, 2007) or other international environmental agreements (Ringquist and Kostadinova, 2005; Aakvik and Tjøtta, 2011) . We assume treatment starts with ratification of Kyoto commitment in national parliaments. The notion is that once ratification takes place, governments adjust their policies and economic subjects adjust there expectations.
This assumption is also common in the evaluation of other international environmental agreements such as the Helsinki Protocol regulating sulfur dioxide emissions (Ringquist and Kostadinova, 2005) . In a robustness check, we use the Kyoto Protocol's entry into force in 2005 as alternative treatment date.
Let Y it denote the outcome variable of interest: country pair i's value of bilateral exports in period t (default sample). In a reduced sample, we restrict attention to exports to non-Kyoto countries. This amounts to evaluating the effect of differential status in trade partners' Kyoto commitments. Y it is determined by Kyoto status and a vector of standard gravity covariates X it including GDPs, bilateral trade costs proxied by joint FTA, WTO and EU membership, and multilateral resistance terms. Bilateral export flows could also be affected by unobservable influences. These might include differences in endowments, geographic location or climatic conditions, culture and also preferences.
Let u i be country-pair specific, time-invariant determinants of exports. The log gravity equation can then be written as
where α t is a common time trend and it is an i.i.d. error term. The coefficient of interest is Kyoto's treatment effect γ.
Self-selection into Kyoto commitments: problems and cures
A complication arising in the estimation of γ is self-selection into treatment. Kyoto membership is the outcome of a political process and therefore not random. When selection is on time-invariant unobservables like differences in climatic conditions or endowments in fossil fuels, differences-in-differences (DID) estimation eliminates u i from equation (1) and recovers Kyoto's treatment effect. 3 Yet, the likelihood of Kyoto commitment is influenced by economic fundamentals also affecting bilateral trade flows. Economic size and economic growth are important determinants, as well as GDP per capita. York (2005) stresses the importance of demographic factors for Kyoto ratification. Rose and Spiegel (2009) 
where E is the expectation operator. In actual data however, we can only observe one of the potential outcomes. Either a unit is treated or it receives no treatment. Matching econometrics infers the missing counterfactual by the outcome of country pairs j in the properly constructed control group. The critical assumptions are that for every treated observation with X i = x there has to be at least one untreated observation with X j = x (overlap assumption) and once we control for covariates X treatment is randomly assigned (ignorability assumption or selection on observables). A simple estimator of the ATT in a very general form isÂ
where w ij is the weight assigned to country pair j in the control group being matched with country pair i and N T is the number of treated country pairs. 5
One way to construct the control group and respective weights is based on the Mahalanobis metric (one-to-one matching, k nearest neighbors). The Mahalanobis metric exploits the euclidean distance in matching variables between i and j, X i − X j . With one-to-one matching the untreated country pair j for which the Mahalanobis metric is smallest (i's nearest "neighbor") is chosen as control and receives a weight of one; for all other untreated pairs the weight is zero. Accordingly, in the case of k-nearest neighbor matching, the k closest neighbors are chosen as control group with w ij = 1/k. 6 An alternative matching approach dates back to Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) and matches on the propensity score (one-to-one, k nearest neighbor, kernel, radius matching). Treatment selection is modeled with a probit or logit model. We use a probit specification as default. Country pairs are matched according to their probability of exporter's Kyoto commitment. Nearest neighbor matching again uses the k nearest neighbors, but now in terms of the propensity score. With kernel density matching, the control group comprises all untreated pairs with propensity scores in the neighborhood of i (defined by the bandwidth), where j receives a higher weight, the closer its propensity score is to i's. Finally, radius matching uses all untreated pairs with propensity score differences smaller than the specified radius.
The simple matching estimator is confounded in the presence of unobserved heterogeneity. However, the framework is easily extended to a DID setup with time-invariant 5 The same logic applies to retrieve an estimate for ATE. The summation then is over all country pairs i = 1, . . . , N and the counterfactual outcome is recovered by matching. In the following, our representation focuses on ATTs but the respective ATEs can be estimated in a similar fashion.
6 With continuous matching variables, the ATT will have a conditional bias depending on sample size and number of covariates. Abadie and Imbens (2006) provide a bias-adjusted version that renders the estimator N 1/2 -consistent and asymptotically normal.
unobservables (see e.g. Heckman et al., 1997; Blundell and Dias, 2009 ). In its simplest version, there are two time periods: a pre-treatment period (t = 0) and a post-treatment period (t = 1). For a country pair receiving treatment, matches in the untreated group are found on the basis of pre-treatment period covariates X i . 7 The ATT compares the differences between treated and control country pairs in the difference between post-and pre-treatment outcomes. So the DID matching estimator iŝ
For example, Egger et al. (2008) apply the DID matching estimator to estimate the effect of regional trade agreements on trade structure and volume.
The DID matching estimator assumes that changes in the covariates X i follow a common time trend. This assumption is not likely to hold in our context, thus creating a bias due to discrepancies in covariates. For example, non-Kyoto countries are predominantly developing countries experiencing higher growth rates in GDP and GDP per capita than Kyoto countries. Regression-adjusted matching estimators deal with this bias by correcting for changes in covariates, see Robins and Ritov (1997) The correction typically is linear in covariates. In equation (4), et al., 1997) , where β stems from a regression of Y on X for the untreated in the post-treatment period. This is equivalent to performing a DID estimation on equation (1) with weighted least squares. The weights stem from propensity score or Mahalanobis matching on pre-treatment covariates as described above. To our knowledge, the present paper is the first application of a regression-adjusted matching estimator in the gravity context. The combination of matching and DID estimation has the advantage of generating a quasi-experimental data set and will take us a long way in reducing selection bias.
A last issue meriting attention is that countries' ratification of the Kyoto Protocol took place in different years. The first committed countries to ratify the Protocol were 
The choice of matching variables
Matching relies on the ignorability assumption. This assumption ensures that once we control for covariates treatment is random. Put differently, it reestablishes a dataset as if from an experimental setup. So successful matching crucially hinges on the choice of matching variables. The appropriate matching variables are those that influence both the decision to select into treatment and the outcome of interest. However, there exists no test equivalent to a goodness-of-fit test for model selection in the matching context. Thus, we use theoretical insights from the public economics and gravity literature to guide our choice. We bilateralize all covariates. That is, we search for clones that are similar, e.g., in their joint GDP.
Bilateral exports are determined by market size of exporter and importer, carbon taxes, bilateral trade costs, price indices and production technology (see Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003; Aichele and Felbermayr, 2011) . Market size is measured by joint GDP and joint population size. GDP and population growth are also typical determinants of IEA membership (see e.g. Murdoch and Sandler, 1997; Beron et al., 2003; York, 2005 Therefore, we include MR terms for FTA, joint EU and WTO membership and bilateral distance, contiguity and common language. We compute multilateral resistance terms as linear approximations to price indices as suggested by Baier and Bergstrand (2009a) .
x index the importer and exporter respectively, k and l are country indices, and θ k is country k's share in world GDP. V comprises the log of bilateral distance and dummies for common language, contiguity, joint FTA, WTO and EU membership. In a robustness check, we will also add political controls to the matching variables (see subsection 3.2 for details). A country's political institutions might influence how easy it is to ratify an international treaty in national parliament. And the political orientation might influence trade patterns.
There is no direct test whether the ignorability assumption holds. However, a balancing test proposed by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985) is used to ensure that the distribution of covariates is the same for treated and control pairs. The test checks whether the differences in the mean of each covariate between treated and matched control country pairs is too large. The STATA routine also provides a measure of bias reduction (based on the differences in the mean of covariates between treated and untreated pairs). An additional prerequisite in matching is the overlap assumption. Since we have about 12.000 country pairs the overlap assumption is most likely fulfilled. Additionally, with propensity score matching, we drop observations outside the common support -i.e. treated country pairs with a propensity score higher than the maximum or lower than the minimal propensity score of untreated pairs. Summarizing, our matching variables are log of joint GDP, log of joint population, log of joint real GDP per capita, the exporter's energy intensity minus the importer's energy intensity, and the six multilateral resistance terms. The list of covariates captures a broad spectrum of determinants of bilateral trade flows which are related to IEA membership.
We hope this ensures that no variable is omitted that could confound the estimates. (d)). Treated country pairs also differ with respect to how close they are to other WTO countries (Panel (e)) and they also tend to be geographically closer to other trade partners (Panel (f)).
Data description
Bilateral export flows for the years 1990-2009 stem from the UN Comtrade database. We use total as well as sectoral export data. Sectoral bilateral exports comprise the 52 nonagricultural 2-digits SITC Rev. 3 commodities. 9 Nominal GDP, population and emission intensities are obtained from the World Development Indicator (WDI) 2010 database.
Real GDP per capita is taken from the Penn World Tables (PWT) For example, plastics in primary form (goods category 57) with -12 percentage points or chemical materials and products (goods category 59) with -11 percentage points less 10 We also run a robustness check on 1995-2009 data, but caution that the financial crisis starting in 2008 could bias the results if Kyoto and non-Kyoto countries were hit differently. energy-intensive goods categories are affected negatively. In Section 4 we will look into sectoral effects in more detail, but first we analyze overall trends in the following section.
Estimates of Kyoto's effect on exports
Before turning to our results, we will revisit the distribution of covariates. After matching, tests for differences in means are rejected for all our matching variables. The achieved bias reductions are large. The kernel densities for treated country pairs (black solid line) and the control group (gray dashed line) confirm this as well (see Figure 3 ). Although not perfectly identical, the distributions are a lot more similar for the two groups. In light of the ignorability assumption this is reassuring.
Baseline results
We apply the variants of the regression-adjusted DID matching estimator outlined in section 2 (Mahalanobis matching and propensity score matching with nearest neighbors, kernel or radius) to estimate the ATT of Kyoto commitment on bilateral exports. The baseline results for the default sample including all country pairs are reported in Table 2 .
Column (1) Columns (5)-(7) show Kyoto's ATT from regression-adjusted DID matching using the same matching variants as in columns (2) 
Robustness checks
In this subsection, we report robustness checks pertaining to the selection model used, the assumption about when treatment occurs, the sample composition, the investigated time horizon and the choice of matching variables. (4). So the ATT from ratification is larger than the one from entry into force.
Since both models have basically the same post-treatment period, it seems that only part of the observed negative competitiveness effects originates from entry into force.
Sample composition. So far, we have analyzed Kyoto countries' exports to all other countries irrespective of their Kyoto status. In a next step, we limit attention to exports into non-Kyoto countries. Column (5) reports results. Comparing the obtained ATTs in column (1) and (5), the ATTs approximately lie in the same range but the effects are less significant. Turning back to the default sample, the estimated effects might be due to special trends in China or economies in transition (EIT). Columns (6) and (7) (8) of Table 3 . We find highly significant ATTs of around 20% in most specifications. These effects are larger than in the baseline suggesting that either effects are larger when taking into account the Kyoto phase 2008-09 or Kyoto countries were hit more by the financial crisis.
Political variables. So far, we have omitted country's political conditions. Whether a country is e.g. politically stable or the government is left-or right-wing will influence its probability to self-select into Kyoto. The trade literature also discusses whether political conditions influence bilateral trade flows (see e.g. Mansfield et al., 2000) . We check whether results are sensitive to including the durability index for political stability from Results are robust to including political variables in the matching process, although the Mahalanobis matching seems less successful in finding a treatment effect. Given that the number of matching variables is increased quite a bit, this might be related to the curse of dimensionality.
Industry-level heterogeneity
Goods categories differ in terms of their average energy intensity, the degree of product differentiation and tradeability, and also in terms of the degree of regulation they are subjected to. This can lead to heterogeneity in trade reactions to Kyoto commitment. This is also reflected in the political debate which focuses especially on effects on energyintensive sectors. So, studying aggregate bilateral exports might lead to aggregation bias.
This leads us to a sector-by-sector analysis.
Results on sectoral ATTs
We estimate the ATT for each of the 51 non-agricultural 2-digits SITC goods categories separately. The matching weight is also obtained separately. We choose regressionadjusted DID kernel propensity score matching as default. Table 4 presents We perform several robustness checks on the sectoral ATTs. Table 5 reports the results for all sectors with significant effects in the baseline. Column (1) provides the baseline for easier comparison. Column (2) uses a logit selection model. Column (3) drops China from the sample. And column (4) adds a host of policy variables to the matching variables. The robustness checks confirm the estimates on sectoral ATTs both in terms of magnitude and significance. In the appendix, we also provide results on sectoral ATTs in the reduced sample (Tables A-1 and A-2) . Here, we find less sectors with significant effects. Yet, the results are consistent for the categories chemicals, non-metallic mineral and metal products and partly also machinery and equipment.
Interpretation
Our estimates suggest large heterogeneity of the Kyoto Protocol's effects on sectoral trade.
To understand these differences, one has to turn to a more structural interpretation of the underlying gravity equation. Aichele and Felbermayr (2011) use a well-specified theoretical model to derive such an equation. A decomposition of the overall ATT is beyond the scope of the present paper, but the analysis in Aichele and Felbermayr (2011) shows that the ATT confounds four elements: sectoral energy intensity, the elasticity of trade flows with respect to cross-country cost differences (essentially the elasticity of substitution in a CES demand system), the effect of Kyoto commitment on production costs, and industry-level transportation costs. Industries differ strongly along these dimensions.
The absolute value of the size of the estimated ATT is increased by the cost effect of Kyoto (which is larger the more energy-intensive an industry is) or by the elasticity of substitution (which measures the strength at which exports react to cost differences). It is decreased by the importance of iceberg trade costs in the sector.
We draw the following broad conclusions. First, for some industries we find that the ATT is statistically identical to zero. Then, Kyoto cannot have had any effect on the cost structure. In industries where we find negative ATTs, i.e. negative export elasticities of Note: The graph shows a scatter plot of sectoral ATTs and average sectoral elasticity of substitution taken from Broda and Weinstein (2006) . The graph only displays sectors with a negative and significant effect from regression-adjusted DID propensity score matching. 
(3) Note: Dependent variable is the log of bilateral export flows. Treatment: exporter ratifies Kyoto commitment. ATTs from regression-adjusted DID matching estimation on pre-and post-treatment averages, the default is -2000 and 2004 -2007 , respectively. Broad: 1998 -2000 and 2005 -2007 . Entry force: 1997 -2004 and 2005 -2007 . Covariates as in Note: The table displays ATTs from sector-by-sector regression-adjusted DID kernel propensity score matching estimation in reduced sample. Dependent variable is log of bilateral exports. Controls not shown. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parantheses. Significance at 1%, 5% and 10% indicated by ***, ** and * respectively. a Goods category considered to be energy-intensive. Dyeing Electrical machinery, apparatus -0.203* -0.268** -0.243* -0.373** and appliances, n.e.s. 
